













































































































































































  One of the lessons from the Asian Currency Crises is the danger of the de 
facto dollar peg adopted by the Asian economies that had extensive trade and 
investment relationship with countries other than the United States.
1 When the 
yen appreciated vis-à-vis the US dollar, the Asian economies enjoyed the boom, 
or a bubble in some cases, due to increased exports. But, when the yen 
depreciated, the Asian economies tended to experience a recession, or a burst 
bubble. The experience of the Asian boom and bust in the 1990s, along with the 
yen-dollar exchange rate fluctuation, is a stark reminder of risk of the fixed 
exchange rate regime. 
An obvious solution for this problem is to increase flexibility of the 
exchange rate. If the baht had appreciated during the yen appreciation phase 
of the 1993-95, the extent of overheating in Thailand might have been limited; 
and if the baht had depreciated along with the yen in 1996-97, then the decline 
in exports could have been mitigated. This kind of exchange rate flexibility 
can  be  achieved  by  a  flexible  exchange  rate  regime  which  keeps  the  real  effective 
exchange rate relatively stable.  
  An obvious insight here is that an emerging market economy, which exports   4
to the United States and Japan, is well advised to consider managed exchange 
rate regimes, in order to avoid excessive volatility of the real effective 
exchange rate.
2 The questions to be considered include how to determine a 
reference rate as an appropriate real effective exchange rate and how much 
fluctuation is excessive. 
  The optimality of the exchange rate regime is defined as the one that 
minimizes the fluctuation of the trade balances, when the yen-dollar exchange 
rate fluctuates. Ito, Ogawa, and Sasaki (1998) proposed how to calculate the 
optimal  weights  when  the  emerging  market  economy  exports  to  Japan  and  the  United 
States only. The optimal weights were calibrated with some assumptions on the 
demand elasticities and export shares. In this paper, we extend the Ito, Ogawa, 
and Sasaki model to include a neighboring emerging market as well as Japan and 
the  United  States.  A  typical  Asian  economy  exports  about  one-third  to  the  United 
States and one-third to Japan, and the rest to countries in the Asian region 
(and EU). Therefore, to simplify, we consider the case that country A (B, 
respectively) exports to the U.S., Japan, and country B (A, respectively). 
Therefore, the real effective exchange rate calculation includes the currency 
of neighboring country. What makes difficult and interesting in this model is   5
that the optimal weights may depend on what the neighboring country is adopting 
as  weights.  In  the  extreme  case,  if  country  A  is  adopting  the  dollar  peg,  country 
B should adopt the dollar peg; and if country B is adopting the dollar peg, 
then country A should adopt the dollar peg. Namely, the dollar peg is a Nash 
equilibrium. However, if country A is using a currency basket which mirrors 
the  export  shares,  adjusted  for  demand  elasticities,  then  country  B  should  adopt 
a (similar) currency basket; and if country B is using a currency basket, then 
country A should adopt a currency basket. This trade-weighted currency basket 
is also a Nash equilibrium.  
  Although the paper is motivated by the recent Asian experiences, the 
application is not limited to Asia. Results obtained in this paper are relevant 
to any developing countries with a trading structure with export destinations 
including different currency areas. 
  Which of the Nash equilibria is chosen depends on the inertia as well as 
rational calculation. If countries can coordinate, then they should choose the 
best among Nash equilibria. This process of choosing the optimal Nash 
equilibrium can be regarded as a regional currency arrangement. Coordination 
failure could occur if a country has some obstacles for coordination from   6
political or social obstacles against breaking inertia. What this paper shows 
is that coordinate managed float by the two countries would increase the 
stability in the trade balance fluctuations. 
  The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the model. 
We assume that the Marshall-Lerner condition, which means that depreciation 
of the local currency will increase the net trade surpluses, is satisfied 
throughout the paper. Section 3 examines what the Marshall-Lerner condition 
implies in our oligopoly model with imported parts and It also examines in what 
situation the Marshall-Lerner condition is satisfied in the model. Section 4 
defines and solves for an optimal currency regime. We introduce the exchange 
rate policy of the monetary authorities of the two countries in order to analyze 




Our earlier work, Ito, Ogawa, and Sasaki (1998), considered the question 
of choosing optimal weights in the basket currency system for a country that 
exports goods to the United States and Japan.  An Asian country was modeled   7
as a one-sector economy where a representative firm assembles parts imported 
from Japan and the United States into manufactured products.
3  The 
representative firm in one Asian country was assumed to compete with Japanese 
firms and/or U.S. firms in the Japanese and U.S. markets. We extend our earlier 
model to include another neighbor country in the model in order to analyze 
interactions of the exchange rate policies among Asian countries.  
We assume that a representative firm in country A imports parts from the 
United  States  and  Japan  and  exports  its  products  to  markets  in  the  United  States, 
Japan, and country B as well as a domestic market.
4 Also, a representative firm 
in country B imports parts from the United States and Japan and supplies its 
products to markets in the United States, Japan, and country A as well as a 
domestic market. We assume that prices of parts from the United States and Japan 
are given in terms of their production country’s currency. 
5 
Asian countries export their goods and services mainly to Japan, the United 
States, and neighboring Asian countries. For example, Thailand exports 
one-fourth  to  Japan,  one-fifth  to  NIES  (Korea,  Singapore,  Hong  Kong,  and  Taiwan) 
and ASEAN-4 countries (Thailand, Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia), 
one-seventh to the United States. These three categories account for more than   8
60  percent.  Similarly,  Malaysia  exports  to  22  percent,  34  percent  and  17  percent 
to Japan, to the United States, and to Asian countries, respectively. The sum 
of these three categories reaches 72 percent. The structure is similar in 
Indonesia and the Philippines. Table 1 shows the export shares by destination 
to Japan, the United States, Asian countries, and four European countries 
(Germany, France, UK, and Italy). Therefore, the assumptions of the model, 
Country A exports to Japan, the United States, and neighboring country B, are 
realistic.  
Each market in countries A and B is supposed to be a duopoly market where 
both country A and B firms compete with each other. Markets in the United States 
and Japan are under monopolistic competition. Country A and B firms compete 
with many domestic firms in each of the U.S. and Japanese markets. They supplies 
their products in the U.S. and Japanese monopolistically competitive markets 
given average prices of their domestic products made in the United States and 
Japan. We assume that prices of the products made in the U.S. and Japan are 
kept unchanged (exogenous to this model) for simplicity. Moreover, we assume 
that all firms in countries A and B have identical cost functions. Each firm 
maximizes its profits in terms of its own home currency.   9
Profits of each firm in countries A and B in terms of its own home currency 
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   (2.1) 
for  and , where 

   denotes price of the country  firm’s products 
in domestic market in terms of home currency ();  

   price  of  the country 
 firm’s products in country  market in terms of country  currency (=  
and(Japan); 	
(the United States) ); 

   price of parts imported from 
country   in terms of country  currency ( = ,  	
  
(      

                 =++ + ) outputs of the country A firms products ( = 
,  and 
 demand function for the country  firm’s products in the 
domestic market;   demand function for the country  firm’s products in the 
Japanese market;   demand function for the country  firm’s products in the 
U.S.  market;      demand function for  the  country    firm’s products in the neighbor 
country’s market; ( ) cost function (C’<0, we assume that C ”=0 for 
simplicity); 

    ≡  relative  price  of  the country firm’s products relative 
to country  in country  market ( = , 	
 and 
   relative price of the 
country  firm’s products relative to the neighbor country’s product in the   10 
country   market;    price of the country  products in country  market in terms 
of country  currency ( = , 	
 
	  exchange rate of currency  in terms of 
country    currency  (  =  ,    and  

 ω  share  of  parts  imported  from  country 
 ( = , 	
 
 
 ωω +=.  
From first order conditions of equation (2.1), profit-maximizing prices of 
the country  firm in Japanese, the United States, country A and B markets, 














µ =  (2.3) 
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µ =  (2.5) 
 
 
     
    	    	  ωω ′ ≡+ +  (2.6) 
for   and , where  {}    
   
     µε ε ≡−   denotes markups of the country 
A firm’s products in country  market (	
 and ), 

 ε  denotes  price 
elasticity of demand for the country  firm’s product in country  market (
	
 and  ). We assume that 

 ε >1. 
 We  convert  equations  (2.2)  to  (2.5)  into  a  logarithm  form  and  derive  reaction 
functions of country A firm in Japanese, the U.S., and country A and B markets   11 
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for    and,  where  
  
    ηµ µ ′ ≡  denotes  price  elasticity  of  the  markups 
of the country  firm’s products in country  market for	
 and . 
  For simplicity, we assume that price elasticities of demand for the country 
A and B firms’ product are equal to each other in each of the country A and 
B markets. That is, 








 εεε == . Thus, price elasiticities of 
the markups of country A and B firms’ products are equal to each other in each 
of the country A and B markets. That is, 








 η ηη == . 
From equation (2.9), we obtain equilibrium prices for the country A and B 
firms’ products in the duopoly market of countries A and B, respectively: 
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 (2.12)   12 
for and .  
  Equations (2.11) and (2.12) shows that the equilibrium prices of country 
A and B firms’ products depend on not only marginal total costs of country A 
and B products but also the exchange rate of currency A vis-à-vis currency B. 
 
(2) Relative prices and demand functions 
  From equations (2.7) and (2.8), we obtain equilibrium relative prices of 
country A and B firms’ products relative to the Japanese and the U.S. domestic 
products in the Japanese and U.S. markets, respectively. 
  ()    
  
   	   ϕ =− −  (2.13) 
  ()
    
 











for  and 	
. 
  Moreover, from equations (2.11) and (2.12), we obtain equilibrium relative 
prices of country A products relative to country B products in each of the 
country A and B markets, respectively. 
  ()    
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Equation (2.15) shows that the equilibrium relative prices depend on the   13 
marginal total costs and the exchange rate of currency A vis-à-vis currency 
B. 
We specify demand functions for country A and B firms’ products exporting 
to the Japanese, the U.S., countries A and B markets from equations (2.13) to 
(2.15): 
  ()    

    	 	  εϕ =− +  (2.16) 
  ()    
  
      	 εϕ =+ −  (2.17) 
  ()
    
 
         	 εϕ =+ −  (2.18) 
  ()    

    	 	  εϕ =− +  (2.19) 
for    and  .  The  equations  show  that  the  demands  depend  on  some  exchange 
rates as well as the marginal total costs, the Japanese and U.S. prices. 
 
3. Effects of exchange rates on trade balances 
  In the next section, we introduce the exchange rate policy of the monetary 
authorities of the two countries into our model under the Marshall-Lerner 
condition to analyze interdependence and coordination failure between their 
exchange rate policies. In this section, we examine what the Marshall-Lerner 
condition implies in the model where domestic firms import parts from Japan   14 
and the United States and in what situation the Marshall-Lerner condition is 
satisfied in the model. 
At first, we analyze effects of changes in the exchange rates on trade 
balances of countries A and B. In the model, trade balances are equal to a total 
exports (to Japan and US) less the sum of total costs of imported parts (from 
Japan and US) and imports from the neighbor country. Therefore, the trade 
balances denominated in the dollar for countries A and B, respectively, are 
shown as: 
                  
               
             ωω =+ + − − −               
(3.1) 
for  and .  
  We derive a relationship between changes in the trade balances and those 
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 τω ω ≡+  for    15 
and ,     represents a rate of changes in variable   . It is assumed, as 
mentioned earlier, that prices of the products made in Japan and the United 
States are kept unchanged. 
The  first  line  of  equation  (3.2)  represents  a  direct  price  effect  of  exchange 
rates on trade balances. The second line of (3.2) represents an indirect effect 
of  exchange  rates  via  PTM  (pricing  to  market)  behaviors  of  country  A  and  B  firms. 
The third line of (3.2) represents an indirect effect of exchange rates on trade 
balances via trade volumes. It is necessary for the Marshall-Lerner condition 
that  the  volume  effect  (third  line  of  equation  (3.2))  dominates  the  sum  of  direct 
price effect (first line of equation (3.2)) and PTM effect (second line of 
equation (3.2)). We consider whether the Marshall-Lerner condition is always 
satisfied in our model if the volume effect dominates the sum of direct price 
effect and PTM effect. For the simplicity sake, we examine whether depreciation 
of the local currency have positive effect on the net trade volumes, that is, 
export volumes minus import volumes. 
  The indirect effect via trade volume (third line of (3.2)) can be described 
as a function of the changes in the exchange rates as follows: 
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      ττ τ τ τ ++ − − = ++ + (3.3)   16 
where  ()    
        
 
                τε ϕ ατ ε ϕ ατ εϕ τεϕ α =− − + + , 
()

     
       
 
                τε ϕ ατ εϕ ατ εϕ τεϕ α =− − + + +,  
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α ≤≡ ≤  for . Signs of the parameters of 

 τ , 

 τ , 


 τ , and 


 τ  are positive, if the export industries are putting 
value added to the parts imports, converting parts into products for exports. 
Hence, we assume that these τ  parameters are positive. 
  The exchange rates have effects on the product prices, which change the 
relative prices of the products in the Japanese, the U.S., and country A and 
B markets. The changes in the relative prices have effects on the demand for 
the products in these markets. Demand for products made in country A (or B) 
is equivalent to export volumes of the country in our model. Since parts are 
imported from Japan and the United States, and some products are imported from 
the neighbor country, the exchange rates have effects on imports as well as 
exports.  
In equation (3.3), it is clear that the exchange rates of the neighbor   17 
country’s currency vis-à-vis the yen and the dollar have unambiguous effects 
on  trade  volumes.  The  appreciation  of  the  neighbor  currency  has  positive  effects 
on the trade volume, as the competitiveness of home products would increase.  
However,  the  exchange  rates  of  the  home  currency  vis-à-vis  the  yen  and  the  dollar 
a priori have ambiguous effect on the trade volumes.  
The exchange rate of the home currency vis-à-vis the yen, that is 
   is 
positive —depreciation will cause export volume to increase— if the following 
inequality is satisfied: 
  ()    
   
    
               τε ϕ ατ ε ϕ τεϕ ατ ε ϕ α −+ + >  (3.4) 
Similarly, the exchange rate of the home currency vis-à-vis the dollar, that 
is 
    is positive, if the following inequality is satisfied:  
  ()      
   
    
               τε ϕ ατ ε ϕ τεϕ ατ εϕ α −+ + +>  (3.5) 
The right hand side of inequalities (3.4) and (3.5) means that the exchange 
rates have negative effects on export volumes into the US or Japanese market 
through increases in cost of imported parts in terms of the home currency. The 
left hand side means positive effects that depreciation of the home currency 
increase export volume through relative prices and decrease import volume of 
parts.    18 
Thus, the effects of the exchange rates on the trade balances are ambiguous 
because parts are imported in our model. Depreciation of the home currency 
against a foreign currency increases price of imported part in terms of the 
home currency. The increase in domestic price of imported parts decreases 
optimal outputs and, in turn, decreases export volumes as well as decrease 
import volume of parts. The depreciation of home currency has an adverse effect 
on the trade balance if the negative effect on exports via imported part costs 
is larger than the positive effects that depreciation of the home currency 
increase export volume through relative prices and decrease import volume of 
parts. In this case, the Marshall-Lerner condition is not satisfied even if 
the volume effect (third line of equation (3.2)) dominates the sum of direct 
price effect (first line of equation (3.2)) and PTM effects (second line of 
equation (3.2)). 
Thus, the dominance of the volume effect is necessary but is not sufficient 
for the Marshall-Lerner condition to hold in our oligopoly model where domestic 
firms import parts from Japan and the United States. In addition, it has to 
be supposed that the direct effect of the exchange rates on export volume is 
larger than the effect via imported part costs on export volume for the   19 
Marshall-Lerner condition to hold. Hence, the Marshall-Lerner condition is 
satisfied in the model when the latter condition as well as the dominance of 
the volume effect is satisfied. 
Next, let us examine the effects of yen’s  and dollar’s appreciation 
vis-à-vis both home and neighbor’s currency on the home trade volume, which 
is related with stability of exchange rate policy of the two countries analyzed 
in the next section. These effects are the sum of 
   and 
   and that of 
    and 
   ,  respectively.  The  following  equation  shows  the  condition  that  the 
yen appreciation (vis-à-vis the both emerging market currencies) produces the 
positive trade volume effects:   
  () ()     
      
  
 
                     τε ϕ ατ ε ϕ ατ εϕ τεϕ ατ εϕ τεϕ α −− + + > +   (3.6) 
Similarly, the following equation shows the condition that the dollar 
appreciation (vis-à-vis the both emerging market currencies) produces the 
positive trade volume effects:  
  () ()         
      
  
 
                     τε ϕ ατ εϕ ατ εϕ τεϕ ατ ε ϕ τεϕ α −− + + +> + +
 (3.7) 
Now, we examine several cases about the import status:  
(1)  The country i imports parts from both Japan and U.S.   20 
Then, inequalities (3.4) and (3.5) may be or may not be satisfied. Also, 
inequalities (3.6) and (3.7) may be or may not be satisfied. 
(2)  The country i imports parts from Japan only. ( 


 ω = ),   
  α =  
Then, (3.5) is satisfied, but (3.4) may be or may not be satisfied. Moreover, 
if the production function is symmetric among the neighbor countries —that is, 
the third term in the left hand side of (3.6) and the right hand side of (3.6) 
cancel out—then inequality (3.6) is also satisfied.  
(3)  The country i imports parts from US only. ( 


 ω = ),   
  α = . 
Then (3.4) is satisfied, but (3.5) may be or may not be satisfied. Moreover, 
if the production function is symmetric among the neighbor countries —that is, 
the third term in the left hand side of (3.7) and the right hand side of (3.7) 
cancel out—then inequality (3.7) is satisfied. 
 
4. Exchange rate policies 
  In this section, we develop the above two-country model to analyze how 
exchange rate policy of the monetary authorities in one country can be affected 
by that in the neighbor country. Interactions of the exchange rate policies 
conducted emerge in the two country model, because the competitiveness of home   21 
goods  depend  on  the  exchange  rate  vis-à-vis  the  neighbor’s.    At  first,  we  suppose 
that the monetary authorities of the two countries have the same objective to 
stabilize fluctuations in trade balances. The policy reaction function of 
country i is derived in terms of the currency basket in order to stabilize 
fluctuations in trade balances, given the exchange rate policy of the neighbor 
country. As a result, it is theoretically possible that a coordination failure 
may occur.
6   The coordination failure is a situation where both of the monetary 
authorities adopt the dollar peg at the same time and a situation where the 
monetary authorities of one country adopt an optimal currency basket peg while 
the monetary authorities of the other country adopt the dollar peg. 
 
(1) Optimal currency baskets 
We express the above effects of exchange rates on the trade balances of 
countries A and B in terms of rates of changes as follows: 
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      =+ ++  (4.2) 
Equations (4.1) and (4.2) corresponds to equation (3.2) for country A and B. 
However, by the assumption of the Marshall-Lerner condition, effects of   22 
equation (3.3) dominate in equation (3.2). Therefore, for the qualitative 
analysis, we may regard signs of A and B coefficients in equations (4.1) and 
(4.2) as the 

  , where x = i, j and y = Y, $, sings of coefficients in equation 
(3.3). The sign conditions derived for equation (3.3) are relevant below. 
Coefficients (

  , 
 
  , 
  , and
   ) on the exchange rates of the 
neighbor country’s currency vis-à-vis the yen and the dollar are unambiguously 
negative in our model. Coefficients (
  , 
   , 

  , and
 
  ) on the exchange 
rates of the home currency vis-à-vis the yen and the dollar are positive under 
the Marshall-Lerner condition.  
 
 (1) The countries A and B import parts from both Japan and U.S. 
Then, inequalities (3.6) and (3.7) may be or may not be satisfied. Therefore, 
it does not always hold that 
  >

  − , 
   >
 
  − , 

   >
  − , and 
 
  >
   −  in intermediate cases. 
(2)  The  country  i  (i  =  A,  B)  imports  parts  from  Japan  only.  ( 


 ω = ),   
  α = . 
  If the production function is symmetric among the neighbor countries —that 
is, the third term in the left hand side of inequality (3.6) and the right hand 
side of inequality (3.6) cancel out —then inequality (3.6) is also satisfied.   23 
Then, 
   >
 
  −  for country A and 
 
  >
   −  for country B. 
 (3) The country i (i = A, B) imports parts from US only. ( 


 ω = ),    
  α = .  
If the production function is symmetric among the neighbor countries —that 
is, the third term in the left hand side of inequality (3.7) and the right hand 
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 −  for country A and 
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  −   for country B. 
We will analyze interactions of exchange rate policies conducted by the 
monetary authorities of countries A and B in the following two cases: one is 
a case where 
  >
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 − , 
   >
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 − , 
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  − , and 
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  >
   −  and the other 
is a case where that 
  <
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 − , 
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  − , and 
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  <
   − . 
A currency basket is defined as weighted averages of exchange rates of a 
home currency vis-à-vis the dollar and the yen. Thus, a currency basket peg 
means that a currency basket of nominal exchange rates is fixed at a level.
 
7 In other words, rates of changes in a currency basket, which is a weighted 
average of rates-of-changes in the exchange rates, is equal to zero: 
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where   
 ( for  = , ): a weight on the dollar in a currency basket for country   24 




  When the monetary authorities peg the home currency to a currency basket, 
relationships between the exchange rates of the home currency vis-à-vis the 







































If the monetary authorities adopt a dollar peg system and a weight on the dollar 
in a currency basket is equal to unity, the exchange rate of the home currency 
vis-à-vis the dollar is fixed at a level while the exchange rate of the home 
currency vis-à-vis the yen co-moves with that of the yen vis-à-vis the dollar. 
The home currency appreciates against the yen when the dollar appreciates 
against the dollar. 
Both of the monetary authorities are assumed to choose weights on the dollar 
and the yen in a currency basket in order to stabilize the fluctuation of their 
own trade balances that is caused by changes in the exchange rates.
 9 Our 
optimality of the exchange rate policy is to stabilize fluctuations in trade 
balances in terms of the dollar under a currency basket peg system. We assume   25 
that the monetary authorities minimize the squared rate of change in trade 
balances in terms of the dollar. That is, the monetary authorities have the 
following policy objective functions to minimize: 
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   =+ + +  (4.7) 
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By substituting equations (4.5) and (4.6) into equations (4.7) and (4.8), 
respectively, the objective functions are shown in terms of weights on the 
exchange rates, 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  From equations (4.9) and (4.10), we can derive first order conditions for 
minimizing their objective functions to obtain the following linear reaction 
functions:
 10  
 








  ++ += +  (4.11) 
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  Equation (4.11) is a policy reaction function for the monetary authorities 
of country A, which means that the monetary authorities of country A choose 
an optimal weight for minimizing their objective function given a weight  
 
    26 
chosen by the monetary authorities of country B. Also, equation (4.12) is a 
policy reaction function for the monetary authorities of country B. They choose 
an optimal weight for minimizing their policy  objective function given a weight 
 
  chosen by the monetary authorities of country A. Thus, both of the monetary 
authorities have to determine their optimal weights in a currency basket while 
they are affected by behavior of the other monetary authorities.  
  There is a unique equilibrium pair of optimal weights for countries A and 
B because both of the policy reaction functions are linear functions. From 
equations (4.11) and (4.12), we derive a pair of optimal weights on the dollar 
in a currency basket to stabilize their trade balances for both of the countries 
A and B at the same time: 
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  are always between 0 and 1 (
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 , respectively, trade balances would be stabilized in both 
of the countries. However, it is not always guaranteed that the optimal weights 
for the both countries are a stable equilibrium.  
















This condition is satisfied in the case where 
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 >
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 − , 
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  In this case, a pair of the weights proceeds along a converging process 







 ).  The  weights 
for both of the countries should converge to their optimal equilibrium ones. 
  Figure 1 shows a case where inequality (4.15) is satisfied. An equilibrium 







 ) is a stable one on a plain where policy 
reaction functions of countries A and B are depicted as lines AA and BB, 
respectively. In this case, each of the monetary authorities of countries A 
and B gradually changes its own weight on the dollar in a currency basket in 
order to stabilize its own trade balances, given the weight chosen by the other 
monetary authorities. As the result, the weights for both the countries can 







 ).   28 























 ) is an unstable equilibrium. This 
condition is satisfied in the case where 
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 <
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 − , 
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   − . In this case, weights diverge out of the optimal weights once 








  Figure 2 illustrates policy reaction functions of both the countries in a 
case where inequality (4.16) is satisfied. In this case, an equilibrium point 







 )  is  unstable.  Suppose  that  each  of  the  monetary 
authorities of countries A and B chooses its own weight in order to stabilize 
its own trade balances, given the weights chosen by the other monetary 
authorities. The weights chosen by the monetary authorities should diverge out 







 ). Thus, the weights on the US dollar increase 
and reach to a unity for both the countries, provided that the weight is 
realistically constrained between 0 and 1. Both of the monetary authorities 
eventually adopt a full dollar peg system rather than the optimal currency 
basket peg system although they have been choosing their weights in order to 
stabilize their own trade balances.    29 
Thus, if inequality  (4.16)  is satisfied, an optimal weight point is unstable. 
Then, it is difficult for the monetary authorities to change their exchange 
rate policy to an optimal exchange rate policy.  
 
(2) Coordination failure in optimal currency baskets 
  Next, we analyze whether the monetary authorities of countries A and B can 
directly shift their exchange rate system from the current de facto dollar peg 
system to an optimal currency basket peg system. The shift to optimal currency 
basket peg system depends on whether each of the monetary authorities can 
decrease fluctuations in trade balances under the optimal currency basket peg 
system in comparison with those under the dollar peg system. Especially, each 
of the monetary authorities should care about fluctuations in trade balances 
in a case where it shifts to the optimal currency basket peg system while the 
other monetary authorities keep the dollar peg system. 
  If both of the monetary authorities adopt the dollar peg (  
 

 == ) at the 
same time, fluctuations in trade balances are calculated as follows: 
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  == =+  (4.17) 
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   == =+  (4.18)   30 
 Suppose  that  A and B coefficients in equations (4.1) and (4.2) are equal 
to the 

  , where x = i, j and y = Y, $, coefficients in equation (3.3). Then, 
it is clear that the fluctuations in trade balances in the case of the dollar 
peg are larger than those in the case where both of the monetary authorities 
adopt the optimal currency basket as shown in equation (4.13) and (4.14) except 
for a case of 
 
  =−  and 

   =−  The optimal exchange rate regime 
corresponds to the dollar peg system if 
 
  =−  and 

   =− . The 
conditions of 
 
  =−  and 

   =−  are expressed as follows: 
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 (4.20) 
If we suppose a symmetric two countries whose parameters are equal with each 
other, we can rewrite equations (4.19) and (4.20): 
    
     
         τε ϕ ατ ε ϕ α −=  (4.21) 
    
     
         τε ϕ ατ εϕ α −=  (4.22) 
Thus, the monetary authorities of the two countries should adopt the optimal 
currency basket peg system rather than the dollar peg system unless equations 
(4.21) and (4.22) are satisfied in a symmetric two country model.   31 
Next, we consider a possibility that the monetary authorities adopt the 
dollar peg system in a situation where equations (4.21) and (4.22) are not 
satisfied in a symmetric two country model. One possible reason is that the 
monetary authorities of one county cannot adopt an optimal exchange rate policy 
because their loss increases if the monetary authorities of the country alone 
adopt the basket while the other country keeps pegging its home currency to 
the dollar. 
 We  consider how the monetary authorities of  one  country  should behave, given 
that the monetary authorities of the other country adopt the dollar peg. For 
example, suppose that the monetary authorities of country A adopt the above 




 = ) while the monetary authorities of country 
B adopt the dollar peg (  
 
 = ). Fluctuations in trade balances for country A 
are obtained in this case as follows: 
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(4.23) 
  When the monetary authorities of country A have options to adopt the dollar 
peg (   




 = ), given that the   32 
monetary authorities of country B adopt the dollar peg (  
 
 = ), the monetary 
authorities of country A compare fluctuations in trade balances between the 
two options. The monetary authorities of country A compare equation (4.23) with 
equation (4.17). They prefer the dollar peg to the optimal currency basket peg 
because fluctuations in trade balance in the case of adopting the dollar peg 
(equation (4.17)) are less than those in the case of adopting the optimal 
currency basket peg (equation (4.23)) (  
        		
        

 == = = > ). 





 = ) while the monetary authorities of country B adopt the dollar peg 
(  
 
 = ), country B would have fluctuations in trade balances: 
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(4.24) 
The fluctuations in trade balances in this case are larger than those in the 
case where both of the countries adopt the dollar peg system 
(  
        		




 == = = > ). 
  We can explain how each of the monetary authorities adopts exchange rate 
policy in Figure 3. Point D represents a situation where both of the monetary   33 
authorities adopt the dollar peg system. Point F represents a situation where 
the monetary authorities of country A adopt an optimal currency basket peg 
system while the monetary authorities of country B adopt keep the dollar peg 
system. If fluctuations in trade balances at point F are larger than those at 
point D, the monetary authorities of country A should not change its own weight 
on the dollar from    




 = . 
  Thus, both of the monetary authorities should keep pegging their home 
currencies to the dollar if their trade balances fluctuate more widely in the 
case of the optimal currency basket peg than in the case of the dollar peg. 
At this time, they face in a coordination failure that they are forced to adopt 
the dollar peg even though the optimal currency basket peg is to minimize the 
fluctuations in trade balances if they adopt the optimal currency basket peg 
at the same time. Only if both of the monetary authorities coordinated to adopt 
the optimal currency basket peg at the same time, they peg their home currencies 
to the optimal currency basket. 
 
6. Conclusion 
  We examined the question of choosing the exchange rate regime for emerging   34 
market economies that export goods to the United States, Japan, and neighbor 
countries.  The  optimal  exchange  rate  regime  is  defined  as  the  one  that  minimizes 
the  fluctuation  of  the  trade  balance,  as  the  yen-dollar  exchange  rate  fluctuates. 
One  might  object  to  this  framework,  since  the  Asian  currency  crises  were  largely 
caused by capital movements, and not by the trade account problem. There are 
two reasons why the trade account stabilization is important. First, one of 
the important triggers that caused sudden reversal of capital (or an attack 
by speculators) in Thailand was the large current account deficit (about 8 
percent of GDP in 1996), partly caused by the overvalued baht. The trade balance 
is  important  since  it  affects  the  confidence  of  the  exchange  rate  regime.  Second, 
when capital movements are large, that would drive the currency overvalued 
and/or  the  current  account  into  deficits.  In  order  to  judge  whether  the  exchange 
rate is misaligned or not, one needs the  “benchmark. ” The exchange rate that 
is calculated to stabilize the real exchange rate gives such a benchmark. 
Therefore, having calculated such a basket value, it gives a good reference 
to answer a question whether capital flows are too much or too little to cause 
misalignment. 
  We can draw some policy implications from these conclusions. First, if the   35 
Asian region that relies on exports to Japan, the U.S., and other regions, wants 
to avoid a boom and bust cycle due to under- and over-valued exchange rates, 
the real effective exchange rate must be managed. In particular, the basket 
currency regime is helpful. Second, the choice of the exchange rate regime (or 
weights in the basket) may depend on your neighboring country’s choice of the 
regime. There may be coordination failure. Given the dollar peg of the 
neighboring country, the choice is the dollar peg, and the neighboring country 
decides the choice in the same manner. However, both countries would be better 
off to move to a basket currency regime with more weights on the yen, if the 
decisions are made simultaneously. Third, in order to help the calculation of 
such a basket tailored to each country, it may be helpful to calculate and 
publish the typical currency basket unit for the region. Such a currency unit 
(say, Asian Currency Unit, or ACU) has weights on the U.S. dollar, the yen, 
and the euro. Each Asian country manages its own currency within the reasonable 
band around the ACU, then the coordination failure may be avoided. Calculation 
of such a currency unit and simulations of the trade balances under the basket 
system is left for future work. 
 Although  this paper simplifies  many aspects of the  real world, the essential   36 
points, we believe, are very relevant to the real world. Asian countries will 
benefit from coordination with each other in choosing the exchange rate regime.     37 
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to US  to 
NIEs4+ASEAN4 
To EU4 
Korea 19.5  19.8  10.8  9.0 
Singapore 17.6 16.9  32.0  10.5 
Indonesia 23.4 11.3  32.8  15.1 
Thailand 25.7  13.8  21.5  9.6 
Malaysia 22.0  16.8  34.1 10.4 
Philippine
s 
20.5 17.5  24.7  10.4 
China 20.4  11.5  35.3  9.7 
Notes:          
All data are from 1997, except Indonesia exports to Taiwan, and Philippine exports to 
Taiwan, 1996. 
EU4=Germany, France, UK, Italy 
ASEAN4=Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, Philippines 
NIEs4=Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore 
Source: Economic Planning Agency, Asian Economies 
1999. 
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Notes: 
 
                         
1 Several Asian countries including Thailand and Korea before the currency 
crisis  claimed  that  they  were  adopting  a  basket  system,  or  a  managed  float  system. 
However, the actual movements of the exchange rates suggest that the weight 
of the dollar was quite high. See Frankel and Wei (1994). In that sense, we 
call the pre-crisis regime as the de facto dollar peg.  
 
2 The so-called  “two-corner solution ”  has become a popular view among some 
researchers and policy makers in the post-crisis discussions. (See Eichengreen 
(1999), for example.) According to this view, free floating, an ultimate 
flexibility, and a currency board, ultimate inflexibility, are only stable 
regime  in  the  long  run.  Any  intermediate  regime —managed  float  or  fixed  exchange 
rate regime without adopting the currency board —is unstable. Advocates of the 
two corner solution cite the fact that Hong Kong and Argentina, both currency 
board economies, survived the currency crisis of the neighboring economies.  
It is not advisable for countries that export substantial volumes to Japan 
as well as the United States to adopt the exchange rate regime pegged to the 
U.S. dollar. Hong Kong seems to be an exception, as it is a small open country 
with lots of reexports and with high labor and price flexibility of domestic 
markets. The currency board of the Hong Kong type is not suitable for other 
Asian economies.  
Would the free floating exchange rate a recommended exchange rate regime 
to other Asian economies? If one believes that the market will (most of the 
time) determine the exchange rate at the level (almost) consistent with 
fundamentals, then the free floating is advisable. However, if one believes 
that the market will (too often) drive the exchange rate to the level (clearly) 
misaligned with the fundamentals, then policy actions to the domestic market 
and some direct interventions to the exchange rate market may be called for. 
The latter view is more convincing in the view of the following evidence. First, 
even advanced countries find it necessary to intervene occasionally. Foreign 
exchange rates sometimes become misaligned with fundamentals. The U.S. dollar 
in 1984-85 and the yen in 1995 are the obvious example of overvaluation. 
Misalignment needs to be corrected by intervention and some policy adjustment. 
Second, the worst of the Asian crises, say November 1997 to January 1998, came 
long after the Asian economies moved to flexible exchange rate regime. When 
contagious crises feed each other among the regional economies, free floating 
regimes would cause a downward spiral of the region’s currencies. Thus, a 
devaluation of a currency would bring down the currencies of trade- and 
investment-related countries. Those who praise China to be a barrier to stop 
a contagious devaluation spiral in the region by maintaining the fixed exchange 
rate should also be advocating some sort of managed float in times of crisis.  
 
3 Flanders and Helpman (1979), Lipschitz and Sundararajan (1980), and Flanders 
and Tishler (1981) emphasized only the real side of the economy in modeling 
the currency basket peg issue. On the other hand, Turnovsky (1982) and Bhandari 
(1985) used a general equilibrium macroeconomic model which included capital 
mobility. 
 
4  Ohno (1989) examined pass-through effects of exchange rates on export pricing 
behavior in manufacturing after taking account of prices of raw materials. 
Marston (1990) modeled a similar pricing to market model. 
 
5 In our model, Japanese and US suppliers of parts are not assumed to price to 
markets because many suppliers exist and they behave competitively. Parts are 
more difficult to differentiate compared to brand-name products.  
 
6 Bénassy-Quéré (1999) and Ohno (1999) analyzed pegging the US dollar as a   44 
                                                                             
coordination failure. 
 
7 A currency basket of nominal exchange rates is fixed at a level because we 
suppose  that  economies  experience  no  inflation.  The  monetary  authorities  should 
adopt a crawling currency basket system if the economies experience positive 
rates of inflation that are different from those in the United States and Japan. 
8 We  limit  a  realistic  case  though  it  is  theoretically  possible  to  suppose   
 < . 
9 The assumption was made in Ito, Ogawa, Sasaki (1998). Alternatively, we may 
assume that the monetary authorities minimize absolute variations of the trade 
account to GDP ratio. Bénassy-Quéré (1999) assumed that the monetary 
authorities are to stabilize both their external competitiveness and the real 
price of their external debt. 
10 We can obtain the linear reaction functions because we assume quadratic 
functions of rate of change in trade balances. It is usual to consider 
fluctuations of trade balances as a second order of moment though it is, in 
general,  unnecessary  to  limit  a  second  order  of  moment.  We  can  obtain  non-linear 
functions if we assume more general form of objective functions. 